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WHAT PRICE SUCCESS ON APPEAL

LEGAL REMEDIES OF LANDLORD AGAINST TENANT
WHO HOLDS OVER; EFFECT OF THE INDIANA
STATUTORY CHANGES OF 1927
According to common law principles and in keeping with
the decided weight of authority at the present time it seems clear
that the landlord has the right to regain possession of the
premises by force where the tenant holds over wrongfully after
the expiration of his lease.' This was the early common law
rule, and, in spite of a certain vacillation in the English decisions
of a later date, the rule holds in most American jurisdictions
today, except in so far as it has been changed by statute.2 This
right to regain possession by force is perhaps one of the most
striking instances in the modern law of a right of self-help which
obtained in many legal relations under the early law. The doctrine itself continues in its full vigor; the landlord may use
whatever force is reasonably necessary to regain possession
against the tenant who wrongfully holds over. Thus he is not
liable if he puts the tenant's family and their belongings out
on the sidewalk in the middle of winter or kills the tenant
himself if he resists when the landlord uses such force as may
be reasonably necessary to regain possession. Except as changed
by statute, this is the common law rule in Indiana today. 3
The courts in some jurisdictions have interpreted these statutory provisions rather liberally so as to allow them to change
this general right of the landlord at common law to regain possession by force. Some jurisdictions have criminal statutes
making the retaking of possession by force punishable by fine
or imprisonment on the theory that it is calculated to cause a
breach of the peace. It will be noted that the basis for criminal
punishment here is that there may be a breach of peace even
though the landlord has a common law right to retake possession
by force. The punishment is for endangering the public peace
not for the retaking of possession under a common law right.
' Harvey v. Brydges, 14 M. & W. 437; Walker v. Chanslor (1908), 153

Cal. 118, 94 Pac. 606, 126 Am. St. 61, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 555; 24 Cye. 1394;
36 C. J. 615-26; Right of a Landlord to Regain Possession by Force, 4

A. L. R. 429; Moyer v. Gordan (1888) 113 Ind. 282, 287, 14 N. E. 476;
Hammond Savings and Trust Co. v. Boney (1915), 61 Ind. App. 295, 310,
107 N. E. 480.
2 36 C. J. 624-26. Hammond v. Boney, supra note 1, 310-312.
3 Hammond v. Boney, supra note 1, 310-12.
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Indiana has such a criminal statute forbidding the retaking of
possession by force and it has been construed strictly by the
courts in keeping with their interpretation that it does not
change the civil liabilities of the parties or enlarge the private
rights of the tenant. 4 It seems clear that those jurisdictions
which hold that such criminal statutes change the common law
of trespass are in error. Indiana has been consistent in holding
that these statutes are criminal and that they do not change the
civil law rights of the parties since they do not do so expressly
and criminal statutes are not construed beyond their express
words or fair meaning derived from the express words. 5
Many jurisdictions have not only criminal statutes designed
to keep the landlord from regaining possession by force but they
have civil statutes giving the tenant a statutory right of action
to sue for damages in case the landlord undertakes to oust him
by force after termination of the lease. The statutes give this
right to anyone "lawfully in possession," which the courts have
interpreted to cover the tenant who lawfully entered into possession under his lease but who held over unlawfully after the
7
termination of the lease.6 Indiana has such a statute also.
In this connection we must note particularly that the Indiana
courts held even this civil statute does not change the common
law right of the land lord to regain possession by force; he
may do so without liability in damages if the tenant sues him
on a cause of action sounding in trespass at common law and
not specifically under the statute.8
The General Assembly in 1927 passed a third statute dealing
with this field of the law by which it is provided that if the
tenant holds over wrongfully the landlord can take possession
providing he files an adequate bond to cover the possible damages
in the suit for possession then pending, unless the tenant elects
to file such a bond and retain possession. 9 Under the Indiana
statutes hitherto there are provisions for summary proceedings
where the tenant holds over; these are designed to aid the landlord in regaining possession quickly by process of law.1o Such
provisions have not been very effective in practice, however,
Sec. 2488 Burns' 1926; Peelle v. State, 161 Ind. 378, 68 N. E. 682.
5 Hammond v. Boney, supra note 1, 295, 312; 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 226;
32 L. R. A. (N. S.) 51.
62 Tiffany, Landlord and Tenant' (1910) see. 212-216; 36 C. J. 624-26.
7 Sec. 9558 Burns' 1926.
8 Moyer v. Gordan, supra note 1; Hammond v. Boney, supra note 1.
9 Laws of Indiana (1927) chap. 254 (p. 741-2).
10 Sec. 9558 Burns' 1926.
4
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inasmuch as the summary proceedings do little more than
expedite the suit in the trial court and the tenant may still retain
possession pending the two or three years that may be consumed
in litigation in the Appellate and Supreme courts. Under the
new statute some of the burdens from this delay will be eliminated, since the landlord will be sure at least of recovering his
damages if he prevails in the final decision, inasmuch as the tenant must file adequate bond in case he elects to retain possession
pending the final outcome of the suit.
It will be observed that even this important legislation is
perhaps inadequate for the full protection of the landlord's
reasonable interests. A contentious and vindictive tenant may
still insist on retaining possession to the great injury of the
landlord and he may do so with comparative impunity, since
the damages are likely to be no more than the reasonable rental
of the property in any case, while the serious, though indirect,
injury to the landlord will be of such character that it cannot
be compensated in damages. If we consider the law of damages
on this point, the likelihood of injury to the landlord will be
readily understood. Under the decisions in Indiana and elsewhere the landlord has three elements of damages: (1) The
actual damages which he has suffered through the tenant's
wrongful holding over.1 Usually this means the rental value
of the premises not on the basis of the original lease, but the
fair rental value for the time that the tenant actually held over
regardless of the lease.' 2 (2) If the landlord has sued the
tenant for possession in a previous action and then sues later
for all his damages he may recover his attorney's fees in the
ejectment suit occasioned by the tenant holding over.' 3 (3) Finally, the landlord may recover consequential damages due to
the tenant's holding over.' 4 Thus it has been held that where
a third person was willing to rent the premises at a higher
rental and had paid a cash bonus for such a lease, the landlord
could recover the amount of this bonus where he was prevented
from carrying out such a lease due to the tenant's holding possession.15 When we have regarded these three general bases
for the recovery of damages in such cases we have indicated
the full remedy of the landlord even under our recent statute.
1136 C. J. 626, 2 Tiffany, Landlord and Tenant (1910) sec. 212.
12 36 C. J. 626.

132 Tiffany, Landlord and Tenant, (1910) see. 212; Harvey v. Pflug,
(1885) 37 La. Ann. 904.
14 2 Tiffany, Landlord and Tenant (1910), see. 212-14.
15 Harvey v. Pflug, supra note 13.
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It will be seen that there is no basis for exemplary damages
in these cases inasmuch as in theory the landlord can recover
damages for all consequences of the tenant's wrongful act;
there is no residuum of insult or reprehensible conduct of such
character that the law awards punitive as well as actual damages. One may reasonably say that it is highly irritating to the
landlord for the tenant to hold over where the landlord has a
future opportunity to sell to a third person; this is especially
true since the landlord knows that at common law he had the
right to take immediate possession by force. It may even be
that this situation is likely to cause a breach of the peace and
a violation of the statute against forcible entry; yet it does not
involve those facts of personal aggression or offensive conduct
which form the basis for exemplary damages. Since the landlord may recover all consequential damages of the tenant's
wrongful holding over there is no basis in law for giving the
landlord punitive damages.
It is, however, the almost daily experience of those engaged
in the management of real estate that even the consequential
damages to the landlord allowed by the law are inadequate in
these cases. For instance, the tenant usually holds over because
the general economic conditions make it advantageous for him
at that time; he does so knowing that it is beyond his legal right
and with the full knowledge that he will have to pay the reasonable rental value of the premises for that time. He holds over
anyway, either because the premises are valuable to him and he
wants in this manner to force the landlord to rent to him, or
because of a vindictive will to injure the landlord. While the
tenant is holding over wrongfully, the landlord may lose opportunities to sell or lease the premises advantageously. Profits
that he might have made from such sale or lease are considered
speculative and are not recoverable in law.' 0 Purchasers or lessees do not make definite offers, however, until they have viewed
the premises and have found, in our supposed instance, that the
tenant is in possession and that they could not secure immediate
possession by lease or sale. It is well known that boom prices
occur from time to time in real estate holdings and that one
must sell then if he is to sell to his greatest advantage. Under
the present Indiana law, however, the tenant might wrongfully
hold over in these circumstances and he would be liable only
for the reasonable rental value of the premises while he held
over; thus for these damages to the landlord in losing his oppor16 4 Sedwick on Damages (9th ed. 1920), see. 999G, 999J.

REMEDIES OF LANDLORD AGAINST TENANT

tunity to sell the property at two or three times the former price
no compensation can be recovered since they are speculative
in nature and cannot be protected in court. This situation is
entirely understood by those who deal in real estate and they
feel that it involves great hardships to business men who realize
that the ability to give immediate possession and clear title are
indispensible to any advantageous sale. It sees clear that this
is a field of the law in which legal remedies are inadequate for
the reasonable protection of business interests. Not only do they
enable the tenant to injure the owner without being answerable
to him in reasonable damages for the injury, but also they
permit a tenant seriously to injure the owner without any significant advantage to himself and purely for his own trivial
convenience or to gratify his ill-will.
In view of this insufficient protection for the rights of the
landlord, many jurisdictions have passed statutes by which the
landlord is to recover double or treble the actual damages in
case the tenant willfully holds over after the termination of the
lease. 17 These statutes usually specify that the landlord shall
recover double or treble the rental value of the premises and
they have been held to be uninforcible by the courts where they
cover all damages, since the courts have regarded them as penal
statutes to be strictly construed. Perhaps this strict construction is sound since it can not be held that the legislature intended
the landlord to recover double or treble damages in case the
jury awarded attorney's fees in previous litigation and extensive consequential damages in addition to the reasonable rental
during the period of the wrongful holding over.' 8
The fairness involved in these statutes is apparent. England
has had such an act for over one hundred and fifty years and it
may be said that such statutes are increasing in this country.' 9 .
Surely the explanation behind them is that the landlord is likely
to suffer heavy damages which will not be recoverable since they
represent speculative damages in theory of law. It will follow
that to give double or treble the rental value will no more than
partially compensate the landlord in many cases, and will not be
improper in any case since it will carry only a fair penalty for
the tenant's wilful and vindictive conduct in holding over unlawfully.
It must be noted, however, that such statutes may preclude the
'7 2 Tiffany, Landlord and Tenant, sec. 213.
18 State v. Pittinger (1905), 37 Wash. 264, 79 P. 942.
19 St. 4 Geo. 2 c. 28, sec. 1. (1729)
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full realizing of the landlord's rights at common law. First,
because the landlord and tenant may provide in their lease that
the landlord shall recover double or treble rental in case the
tenant wrongfully holds over. Such a stipulation is enforced
by the courts on the ground that it is a provision for liquidated
damages and not a penalty. On the other hand these statutes
for double or treble damages are construed by most courts to
supersede any such contractual provisions for damages, so that
the landlord may recover only under the statute and not under
his contract. 20 Secondly, because the landlord may now recover
consequential damages where the tenant holds over, but where
there is a statute giving double or treble damages the statute
refers only to the rental value. In all cases now where the
statutes have been held effective they have actually said that the
landlord shall recover double or treble the fair rental during the
holding over period.21 Such a double or treble recovery under
the statute is held to preclude any right of the landlord to recover
consequential damages in addition to the fair rental value. 22
In theory it may well be that the common law and statutory
provisions now in force in Indiana are both logical and adequate.
In legal theory the landlord should not be entitled to speculative
damages and under the present law he can recover consequential
damages due to the tenant's wrongful act. In theory therefore
he would recover a larger sum as consequential damages in a
proper case than he would under a statute giving double or treble
damages. In practice, however, it is likely that the statutory
provisions for double or treble damages where the tenant wrongfully holds over would afford a more adequate protection to the
landlord and would be entirely fair to the tenant; they would
give the landlord partial compensation for damages which it
would be difficult for the jury to estimate; or which would be
speculative under the law of damages and not recoverable, although in the field of business a serious financial injury had been
done. Perhaps we may expect, therefore, that the legislature in
Indiana will later complete the statutory protection of the landlord by allowing him to recover double or triple the rental value
23
of the premises, in case the tenant holds over wrongfully.
PAUL L. SAYRE.
Indiana University School of Law.
20 36 C. J. 626.
212 Tiffany, Landlord and Tenant, sec. 213; Regan v. King (1916) 39
Nev.2 2 216, 156 P. 688.
Beach v. Nixon (1873), 9 N. Y. 35, 36 C. J. 626.
23 If the tenant holds over because of an honest misinterpretation of

his rights, he is never liable under these statutes.
409(5).

18 A. and E. Encyc.

